Critique of 1967 Invasion of Mid-Western Region by Biafran Forces

Abstract

 
The Biafran invasion of the Midwest Region in 1967 during the Nigerian Civil War resulted in a contest between the contending forces. The invasion generated intense debate among scholars, military officers, and political analysts. The Federalist school perceives the invasion as the conspiracy of Western Igbo military officers, who occupied the top hierarchy of the Fourth Area Command of the Nigerian Army, Benin City. The pro-Biafran analysts contend that the Federal Military Government had intelligence reports about the imminent Biafran invasion, but failed to defend the Midwest Region. They argue that the lethality and swiftness of the invasion were caused by lack of adequate arms to confront the Biafran forces. Given this polemical divide, this paper takes this debate further by exploring the two schools of thought to bring out refreshing perspectives on the inevitability or otherwise of the Biafran invasion. Findings have established that both the Federal and Midwest authorities should be blamed for the failure to forestall the invasion given the intelligence reports at their disposal. The West Igbo military officers should not be entirely blamed for conspiracy as evidence has shown that the Midwest border with Biafra was porous and not properly secured. Besides, the Fourth Area Command of the Nigerian Army lacked adequate arms to contain the Biafran forces. This paper suggests that if the Federal and Midwest State governments had acted swiftly based on intelligence reports and provided adequate arms to the Fourth Area Command of Nigerian Army, Benin, the invasion would have been forestalled.